DWORKIN, PRECEDENT, CONFIDENCE, AND ROE V WADE
GREGORY B. DAVIDt
INTRODUCTION

January 22, 2004, marked the thirty-first anniversary of Roe v. Wade.
When the Supreme Court reconsidered and upheld the merits of Roe
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey2 in 1992, the
majority put front and center the importance of stare decisis. The
Court cited Justice Benjamin Cardozo for the wisdom that a judicial
system could not function if it considered each issue anew in every
case that raised it.3 Precedent assumes a greater role in a special case
like Roe, the majority said, where the "Court's interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution." 4 Needless to say, Roe did not end the controversy,
and with a GOP-controlled Congress and White House, Roe's status is
somewhat precarious. 5 On January 23, 2003, President George W.
Bush promised antiabortion protesters assembled on the National
Mall "'to protect the lives of innocent children waiting to be born"'
and pledged that his administration would promote "'compassionate
alternatives"' to abortion.6 The Supreme Court likely stands one vote
away from overturning Roe. As Justice Harry Blackmun himself noted
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1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
3 Id. at 854 (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS
149 (1921)).
4 Id. at 867.
5 See, e.g., Activists Mark 'Roe vs. Wade' Anniversary, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2003,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-01-22-abortion-anniver
sary.x.htm ("Abortion opponents see their best chance in years to erode if not overturn Roe.").
6 Sean Loughlin, Bush Callsfor Protection of 'ChildrenWaiting to be Born,' CNN.COM,
Jan. 23, 2003, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/22/bush.abortion/
index.html (quoting President Bush).
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in his opinion in Casey: "I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light."7 Within
the next few years, it is likely that at least two Justices will step down,
and depending on their replacements, the partial dissenters in Casey
may garner the fifth vote necessary to overturn Roe.
The Voice of the Cynic and the TheoreticalResponse
It is conceivable that the political party that puts the next Justice
on the bench will decide the fate of Roe. The cynic voices this concern
with two grave charges. First, the cynic suspects that the new Justice
will not only vote based solely on political persuasion, but also that she
will do so against the mandate of stare decisis. That is, the Justice will
disregard established law and vote solely on the basis of political preference. The second charge is somewhat different. The cynic argues
that a judge can always fashion a legal argument to support how she
would vote politically. So, the cynic is concerned that the judge will
either ignore the law or simply shape the law to serve whatever outcome she desires. Perhaps the trend over the last twenty years of a polarized Supreme Court voting along party lines warrants such distrust.8
Whether or not such charges are descriptively accurate, a system
of adjudication should take account of such concerns. When developing a theory of adjudication, one determines howjudges should decide
cases. That is, one asks what normative constraints should bind judges
in the context of decision making, including whether to adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis. Applying this normative inquiry to Roe, I ask
to what extent deference to prior reasoning should factor in the
Court's decision.
In this context, I critically examine the role of confidence in
Ronald Dworkin's theory of adjudication. Namely, I propose to answer the following two-part question: What should constitute ajudge's
confidence that a prior decision was wrongly decided, and how much
confidence should be required to reject precedent? As to the first
part, I will argue that ajudge's confidence should reflect a good faith
attempt to balance the underlying legal principles of the case. As to
the second part, I will argue that common law standards governing

7

8

505 U.S. at 923.
See, e.g., EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS:

THE FIRST EYEWITNESS AC-

COUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 515 (1998) (describing
the "widening polarization" of the Court and the increasing ability of individual Jus-

tices to tip the majority).
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the conditions under which one should defer to precedent should
dictate the amount of confidence required.
With these requirements in place, neither concern of the cynic materializes. That is, if a judge has a sufficient degree of confidenceconstituted by proper considerations-she will not decide a case like
Roe on the basis of political persuasion, nor will she mold a legal argument to artificially reach the result she would have preferred if the law
did not govern. This conclusion, however, requires certain assumptions about the nature of cases and judicial decision making. In the
Section entitled "Good Faith,"' I seek to reveal what one must assume
to achieve the possibility that ajudge can decide a case in good faith.
Optimistically, one significant contribution of this Comment will be its
attempt to make explicit the assumptions that underlie such a model
of confidence and, more generally, judicial decision making within
Dworkin's theory of adjudication.
My project does not end there, however. I shall argue that, even
where objective standards establish the level of confidence required to
overturn precedent, a proper theory of adjudication must allow for
disagreement among individual judges about what those objective
standards are and what level of confidence they require. Such disagreement goes to the heart of the dispute over how to properly give
Roe the respect it deserves. That is, a workable theory must allow
judges to disagree over the very standards that should govern the degree of deference to which a case such as Roe is entitled. Ultimately, a
theory of adjudication cannot provide a bedrock place of agreement,
a starting point from which judges agree about how to treat precedent. Although such a conclusion is disappointing because it asserts
that, even at the theoretical level, no ground on which the Court
should agree can be established, this Comment finds such a conclusion inevitable.
Part I sets the stage with the background necessary to make sense
of this project. There I explore Dworkin's rejection of H.L.A. Hart's
conceptual understanding of judicial discretion, especially in the
context of precedent. I then discuss the role of legal principle in
Dworkin's theory of adjudication, as well as the tradeoff it represents
between stability and predictability on the one hand and the recognition of the possibility of error on the other. Part II sets forth the main
argument of the Comment. I draw a distinction between first- and
second-order legal principles, which I utilize to explain the grounds of
9 Infra Part IID.
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disagreement over the role of precedent. I address the questions regarding what confidence is and how much should be required in the
context of rejecting precedent. Additionally, throughout Part II, I
discuss the practical ramifications of the conclusions I reach on Roe.
I. HART, DWORKIN, AND DISCRETION

A. Judicial Obligation: Positivism and Dworkin
In the past thirty-five years, two important but fundamentally different legal theories have attempted to address the philosophical
question of the nature of judicial obligation.'0 The first approach is
modern positivism, best represented by H.L.A. Hart" and Joseph
Raz. 12 According to this view, a judge is obligated to apply the rules
that the legal system recognizes as law. Such law might derive from
precedent that judges establish or rules that the legislature or some
other lawmaking body creates. As we shall see below, a rule does not
always determine how a judge should decide a case. When this occurs, the judge's decision involves an exercise of discretion because
the law poses no obligation to decide the case one way, rather than
another.
The second approach is that of Ronald Dworkin. 13 As I shall explore in more detail below, Dworkin conceives of the law as involving
more than the rules that have been issued by the legislature, judges,
or other law-creating entities. In contrast to positivism, Dworkin conceives of a system of adjudication that operates in accordance with
moral principles regarding what is just and fair. 14 These legal principles are whatjustify the various legal rules within the system.
Many find the role that Dworkin assigns to legal principle appealing because it provides the theoretical underpinnings of a predominate
10 See Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7
OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 215 (1987) (describing the trends in legal theory regarding
judicial obligation and summarizing the basic difference between the responses of
modern positivism and that of Dworkin).
11 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
12 JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND
NORMS (1975).
Of course, other phi13 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
losophers have forwarded similar themes: George P. Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal
Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970 (1981); Charles Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of
Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (1980).
14 Some forms of positivism may incorporate a role for moral principles as well.
See, e.g., HART, supra note 11, at 250 ("[T]he rule of recognition may incorporate as
criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values .... ).
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legal mode of reasoning used by law professors, lawyers, and courts."
To illustrate this mode of legal reasoning, consider the following routine task a professor might invite her first-year law students to perform. She presents the class with a series of seemingly disparate cases.
The professor then asks the class to reconcile these differences, typically I6by developing an explanation that can justify the results in each
case.
Often such an explanation involves the identification of a
principle or principles that could justify the results in both cases, even
though no case ever made reference to such a principle.
Judges must perform a similar task in a number of different contexts. A federal district court judge, for example, is bound by the decisions of the court of appeals and the Supreme Court above her. She
has a responsibility to apply those decisions, when applicable, to cases
that come before her. When such case law seemingly conflicts with
itself, the judge bears the responsibility of reconciling the cases when

Even those opposed to Dworkin's account of legal principle agree with
his descriptive observations regarding the prominent role that legal principle plays in the
language that judges and other members of the legal community use. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 279, 288 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995), reprinted in 82 IOWA L.
REV. 739, 748 (1997) ("[The force of Dworkin's account of legal principles] comes
from how well it tracks the standard methodologies of legal scholars, advocates, and
judges.").
16 For example, the professor may ask the class to consider
two examples of negligence. In the first case, a driver violates a statute that requires the use of headlights
while driving at night and crashes into another car. The victim sues and wins, using
the violation of the statute as strong evidence of negligence. In the second case, an
unlicensed chiropractor provides treatment for a patient's disease, violating a statute
that required a medical license for diagnosis and treatment. The patient later suffers
from paralysis and sues her chiropractor. Unlike the first case, the court finds that violation of the statute does not constitute evidence of negligence. The cases seem at
odds with each other because both involve violations of statutes, but only in the first
case does the court permit the jury to use this as evidence of negligence. The professor asks the law student to provide and defend some principle thatjustifies both cases,
despite their apparent differences. One might argue that violation of a safety statute
should only count as evidence of negligence if it has direct bearing on the injury. In
the first case, violation of the requirement to use one's headlights at night has direct
bearing on the accident that occurs. But in the second case, one might argue that violation of the licensing statute does not have direct bearing on the injury because it is
possible that the chiropractor treats the patient with the care and skill that would have
been exercised by a qualified practitioner. The goal is to articulate a principle, operating at a more general level than the decision of either case, which not only resolves the
differences between the cases, but also justifies the results. These two hypothetical cases
are based on Tedla v. Elinan, 19 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1939), and Bro7n v. Shyne, 151 N.E.
197 (N.Y. 1926). When I was a first-year law student, my torts professor called on the
class to perform this exercise.
15
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possible before determining that some subset of them were wrongly
decided.
B. Hart andJudicialDiscretion
Imagine that a state legislature enacted the following statute: "All
owners of motorcycles must obtain a proper license for their vehicle.
Failure to do so will result in a $250 fine." The vast majority of the
time, one would have no uncertainty about the application of this rule
to a particular case. Harley-Davidsons are model examples of vehicles
to which the statute applies, whereas cars and trucks clearly fall outside its scope. But even such a plain and unambiguous statute leaves
open the possibility of a case where the proper application of the rule
remains uncertain. A moped might, for example, prove a borderline
case. In some respects it resembles a motorcycle, but unlike a motorcycle, a moped cannot travel at high speeds. One might wonder
whether a moped should be classified as a "motorcycle" for purposes
of analysis under the state's law.17 A judge confronted with the citation of a moped owner will find little guidance in the statute as to its
applicability to such a case."'
According to Hart's account, such an example demonstrates what
he calls the "open texture" of the law. 19 A general rule, like the statute
above, is such that it cannot anticipate every concrete particular case;
it is inevitable that uncertainties will arise about how to apply the rule
in some cases. 20 At some point, the application of a rule will prove indeterminate, or as Hart terms it, "open textured."
Generally, a rulemaking body faces two handicaps. First, a rule
cannot anticipate every possible scenario to which it is intended to
apply, as was the case in the moped example. Second, a rulemaking
body has an "indeterminacy of aim."2 ' Hart gives an example of a rule
prohibiting a person from bringing a vehicle into the park.2 Ostensibly, the general aim of this rule is to achieve peace in the park, and
the aim is determinate with regard to clear cases such as cars or
trucks. But given such an aim, the rule is indeterminate with regard
17

See, e.g., FLA.

STAT. ANN.

§ 320.01(27)-(28) (West 2003) (distinguishing a "mo-

torcycle" and a "moped" on the basis of whether or not the moped has "pedals to permit propulsion by human power").
For a similar example, see HART, supra note 11, at 126.
19 Id. at
128.
20 Id. at 126-28.
21 Id. at 128.
22 Id.
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to an unenvisaged borderline case, such as a remote control toy car.
A question exists as to whether some degree of peace should be sacrificed in light of the interests of those who play with the toy cars in the
park.24 To the extent that the general aim of the rule does not dictate
how to handle such a borderline case, Hart concludes that its purpose
is indeterminate and that resolution of such a case
will provide an op25
portunity to render more definite the initial aim.
The question that I would like to focus on for the moment is the
extent to which the open-textured nature of legal rules allows for-or
even requires-judicial discretion. According to Hart's view, examples such as the moped or the toy car in the park suggest that certain
cases that are legally unregulated will arise, meaning that no decision
is dictated by the law. To that extent, the law is incomplete. As we
shall see below, this situation, in which no settled rule of law disposes
of a particular case, is what Dworkin refers to as a "hard case[].27
When encountering such a case, Hart envisions the judge acting in a
limited law-creating capacity, filling those gaps in a quasi-legislative
28
manner.
Hart addresses three criticisms that Dworkin levels at such a view
of judicial discretion. First, Dworkin claims that Hart's account is descriptively false. 29 That is, Dworkin charges that Hart's account fails
to appreciate how the different Anglo-American legal systems actually
function. As evidence, Dworkin observes that, in hard cases, judges
do not literally speak as if creating new law. Instead, they reason by
analogy to relevant principles in other areas of the law. 30 The language that judges use suggests that they merely enforce preexisting
3
law, rather than create new law and apply it retroactively. '

Hart responds to Dworkin's charge by dismissing this evidence as
mere ritualistic language that camouflages the legislative-like capacity

23

Id. at 129.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 272.

26
27
28

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81.
See HART, supra note 11, at 132 (likening judicial decision making to adminis-

trative rulemaking).
29 See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81 (denouncing
legal positivism as an "inadequate" theory); HART, supra note 11, at 273 (listing Dworkin's criticisms, including the
charge regarding "false description of the judicial process").
31 DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81; HART, supra note 11, at 273-74.
DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81, 89; HART, supra note 11, at 273-74.
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that judges assume in unregulated cases.
That is, he grants that
judges may use language that suggests that they only enforce preexisting law, appearing as though prior law necessitates their conclusions.
Nonetheless, use of such language is merely the custom of the trade,
and not necessarily indicative of what judges are really doing, espe33
cially when confronted with a hard case. Reasoning by analogy to a
relevant area of the law is one such customary technique that gives the
illusion that the law entails the judge's conclusion. Hart maintains,
however, that such reasoning could potentially support deciding a
case either way and that the judge merely acts as would a "conscientious legislator," attempting to do what is best given the previously established priorities within the law.34
Second, Dworkin charges that Hart's account ofjudicial discretion
supports an undemocratic form of lawmaking.3' That is, lawmaking
should be entrusted to those elected to do so-namely, members of
the legislature-and not to judges who are typically not elected. Hart
responds that whatever lawmaking capacity judges have is limited.3
Such a restricted power of lawmaking is a small price to pay to avoid
the alternative inconveniences, such as sending every case exemplify. 37
ing some element of open texture to the legislature for resolution.
Third, Dworkin claims that Hart's account ofjudicial discretion is
38
unjust because it is a form of ex post facto lawmaking.
That is, the
judge not only creates law in legally unregulated cases, but also applies
it to the current controversy after the fact. One might think this practice is unfair because it disappoints the justified expectations of the
parties who assumed they would be regulated by the existing law in
place at the time of their acts. 39 To apply newly created law to previous acts upsets this expectation of the parties. Hart responds that this
objection is irrelevant in the context of hard cases because they represent instances where the law is entirely unregulated, where there is no
clear state of law on which to build justified expectations. 40 Because
the parties could not have reliably anticipated the new law that the

32

HART, supra note 11, at 274.

33 Id. at 274-75.
4 Id. at 275.
35 DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 84-86; HART, supra note 11,
at 275.
36

HART, supra note 11, at 275.

37 Id.
38

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81; HART, supra note 11, at 276.

39 DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 86; HART, supra note 11, at 276.
40

HART, supra note 11, at 276.
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judge applies retroactively, its application violates no expectations of
the parties.
If one accepts Hart's rejection of Dworkin's retroactivity charge,
one still must confront the question of what standards the judge
should use when deciding a legally unregulated case. Hart admits that
flipping a coin would constitute an inappropriate abdication of judicial responsibility. After all, one of a judge's responsibilities is to issue ajudgment comprised of reasons supporting the decision. 2 Hart
suggests that a judge might decide the case in a way that best conforms to other areas of law. Thus, principles that justify one area of
the law could be applied to the present case, even if they are not binding. 3 Although this sounds somewhat like Dworkin's position (discussed below), Hart takes a substantially different conceptual path.
According to Dworkin, judges are bound equally by legal principles
and legal rules." By contrast, Hart conceives of principles as standing
outside of the law; ajudge can rely on them to reach a result in a hard
case, but they do not compel her to reach a decision either way.45
Dworkin's normative account of judicial discretion eliminates the
quasi-legislative role that Hart would have judges assume when confronting hard cases. Rejecting Hart's account, Dworkin says that "[it
remains the judge's duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the
rights of the parties are, not to invent new rights retrospectively." 46 In
the context of hard cases, one might wonder how a judge could
determine what the parties' rights entail when the applicable rule of
law does not supply an answer. To resolve such an inquiry, Dworkin
places heavy emphasis on the role of legal principles.47 To understand
41

See id. at 273 (stressing that judges should not exercise their lawmaking powers

arbitrarily).
42 Id.
43

Id. at 274-75.

44 DWORKIN, supra note 13, at
37-38.
45 HART, supra note 11, at 272-73.
46

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 81.

47 Scholars routinely single out Dworkin as the most influential proponent
of the

importance of legal principles in legal and jurisprudential reasoning. See, e.g., Alexander & Kress, supra note 15, at 739 ("Dworkin's jurisprudential theory... is the most
powerful extant theory that builds upon legal principles .... ); Michael S. Moore,
Legal Principles Revisited, 82 IOWA L. REv. 867, 867 (1997) ("Dworkin's treatment [of
legal principles] was systematic and even in places elegant[, and he] ... has stated the
problem for our generation in the way that Langdell, Cohen, Levi, and Fuller did for
theirs."); Stephen R. Perry, Two Models of Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REv. 787, 807
(1997) ("The most powerful advocate of the thesis that legal principles have a role to
play in law and legal reasoning has been Ronald Dworkin."); Jeremy Waldron, The Need
for Legal Principles,82 IOWA L. REV. 857, 857-58 (1997) (stating that Dworkin offers the
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Dworkin's rejection of Hart, one must determine what kind ofjudicial
discretion Hart embraces that Dworkin does not.
C. What Kind of Discretion?
To evaluate Hart's claim that judges have discretion, Dworkin distinguishes between three different kinds of discretion and asks into
which category Hart's version of discretion falls.4 s First, there is a weak
sense of discretion, meaning simply that a judge cannot always apply
the pertinent standards mechanically and produce a decision, but
sometimes must use her judgment.49 In the child custody setting, for
example, a judge may have to decide what is "in the best interests of
the child."'50 While such a determination may prove difficult, the
judge only has discretion in the sense that the standard does not
automatically produce an answer, but rather requiresjudgment.
A second weak sense of discretion, according to Dworkin, arises in
The Supreme
cases where a judge's decision is not reviewable. 5
Court, for example, exercises discretion in this sense because there is
no higher court that could potentially overturn its decisions.
Lastly, Dworkin describes a third, stronger sense of discretion
where a judge is "simply not bound by standards set by the authority
in question." 52 This sense of discretion does not deny that there are
rules and principles that purport to bindjudges. Rather, it posits that
in many cases those rules and principles are so vague and difficult to
Under this
apply that, in actuality, they fail to bind judges at all .
stronger sense of discretion, no rule or principle binds the judge
because the law fails to dictate a right answer. This does not mean,
however, that the judge is free from criticism on other grounds, such

best-known theory of the relationship between legal principles and moral principles, as
well as of moral reasoning).
48 See DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 31 ("Discretion, like the hole in
a doughnut,
does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is
therefore a relative concept.").
49 Id.
50 The "best interests of the child" standard remains the modem
test for analyzing
D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN
FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 805 (1998).
51 DWORKIN, supra note 13, at
32.
child custody disputes.

52

Id.

53

Id.

2004]

DWORKIN, PRECEDENT, CONFIDENCE, AND ROE

1231

as an 4allegation that the decision is unfair or economically ineffi5
cient.
Considering what we know of Hart's account of legal rules, judges
have, at least on some occasions, discretion in all three senses. The
open texture of rules at the very least requires judges to exercise
discretion in the first weak sense. 5 That is, a rule will not always obviously or mechanically resolve a particular case, but may require carefuljudgment. Hart also would not contest the second sense of discretion, that the decisions of courts of the highest level are not reviewable. The fact thatjudges descriptively have these kinds of weaker discretion is obvious. Equally undisputed is that they should. Dworkin
56
agrees thatjudges have discretion in the weaker sense.
The heart of the disagreement centers on whether judges should
have discretion in the stronger sense.57 Dworkin offers a fundamentally different view of the law than Hart's breed of positivism. Dworkin
believes thatjudges should not have this third, stronger kind of discretion. 's Let us consider in the next Section one powerful argument
that Dworkin poses against the stronger sense of discretion.
D. Strong Discretion and Precedent
It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to reject an earlier decision it made or prior reasoning it employed. Since judges are bound
by rules in Hart's view, one might wonder where they get the power to
change them. To formulate this concern another way, if judges have
discretion in the strong sense to change established rules, then these

54 See id. at 33 ("The strong sense of discretion is not tantamount to
license, and
does not exclude criticism.").
55 Id. at 31-32.
56 See id. at 38 ("[T]he positivists' theory of judicial
discretion is... trivial [if] it
uses 'discretion' in a weak sense .... ").
57 This disagreement really poses two questions, one descriptive and one
normative. The first question asks whether some particular judges, such as American judges,
actually have strong discretion in the legal system as it stands. The second question
concerns whether they should. I shall focus on the latter.
58 DwORKIN, supra note 13, at
37.
5
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), stands out as a rejection of a
previous line of cases and is a decision to which we shall return later. Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938), is one of the most famous examples of the Supreme Court's rejection of entrenched statutory interpretation. In Erie, the Court rejected its previous one-hundred-year-old statutory interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000), finding that the word "law" as used in the statute
included the common law. 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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rules seemingly would not be binding on them. 6° A positivist such as
Hart must explain how a judge can have
the power to reject a rule
61
while at the same time being bound by it.
One possibility is for the positivist to deny that judges should have
the power to reject precedent. Such a system is undesirable, though,
because of the value of expunging outmoded rules-which were justified by now-rejected values-from our legal system. Without such
ability, the Court could not have ruled as it did in a case like Brown v.
Board of Education,62 but would have needed to continue applying the
"separate but equal" doctrine. That is, such a system would not allow
any judicial mechanism for correcting rules that were generated by
reasoning now deemed faulty. Moreover, such a rigid structure would
command complete deference to those who previously decided the
issue. This is a topic to which I shall return later, but for now, suffice
it to say that a vigorous system of adjudication must allow for some
principled accommodation of different viewpoints. Complete deference would serve only to lock in the opinions of the past.
Alternatively, the positivist could argue that additional rules, dictating whether prior reasoning should stand or fall, could solve this
dilemma. The legislature, for example, could enact a statute that
prohibits judges from rejecting prior reasoning except under some
specified set of circumstances. Let us call such a set of rules, RRPR"rules for rejecting prior reasoning." Even with RRPR in place, Hart
would concede that the open nature of rules would inevitably lead to a
case where RRPR did not dictate whether some bit of prior reasoning-namely, an established rule-should stand or fall. Let us call
such a case, BC, standing for "borderline case." BC is an instance of
prior reasoning that establishes a rule for which RRPR does not dictate whether or not ajudge should reject it. As we have seen, when a
rule does not automatically dictate an answer, the judge has discretion

61

DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 37.
For clarity's sake, I want to emphasize the difference between the strong sense

of discretion and the power to reject a rule. Recall the motorcycle statute, supra note
17 and accompanying text. We have seen that, in Hart's view, a judge confronted with
the case of a moped will have strong discretion to determine whether or not the motorcycle statute should apply. Even if the judge determines that the motorcycle statute
should not apply, such a holding does not amount to an outright rejection of the statute. The statute still regulates the majority of cases that do not exhibit any element of
open texture.
62 347 U.S. at
495.
63 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), established
the "separate but equal"
doctrine, which remained good law until Brown. The overruling of Plessy also receives
mention infra notes 131-32, 134 and accompanying text.
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in the strong sense to decide. That is, despite the presence of RRPR,
cases such as BC will arise for which the rule does not supply an answer, leaving the judge strong discretion to reject the rule as she
wishes. This, however, leaves the positivist back in the predicament
that hypothesized rules such as RRPR were meant to prevent: a judge
in a position to exercise strong discretion to reject a rule that should
have binding effect on her.
The positivist might then argue that, if rules cannot do the trick,
perhaps principles can. As we have seen, a major conceptual difference between positivists and Dworkin is that the former regard principles as extra-legal in the sense that they do not bind judges. But if
they are not binding, then a judge has the freedom, or strong discretion, to decide whether the prior reasoning should stand. Thus,
Dworkin argues that failure of the aforementioned alternatives forces
the positivist to adopt standards or principles that are not extra-legal
but binding on judges. 64 Such principles would remove strong discretion when it comes to precedent, dictating whether ajudge may reject
an established rule. 65 We have come far enough now that we must examine the nature of legal principles and how they differ from legal
rules to make sense of Dworkin's claim.
E. Rules vs. Principles
Unlike principles, rules are "applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion." 66 Recall our earlier example of the motorcycle statute. 61 As a
rule, the statute requires all motorcycle owners to obtain a proper license. If the conditions of the rule are met, then the rule must be
applied. Therefore, if there is a motorcycle owner without a proper
license, a penalty is undoubtedly appropriate. Alternatively, if the
conditions are not met-for instance, if the vehicle in question is a
car-then the rule should not be applied.
Principles, on the other hand, do not operate in such a conclusive
fashion. Instead, principles possess an element of weight." To understand what this means, consider the following example that Dworkin

64

DwORKIN, supra note 13, at 46.

65

Id. at 37-39.

66

Id. at 24.

Supra notes 17, 61 and accompanying text.
See DwORKIN, supra note 13, at 26 ("Principles have a dimension that rules do
not-the dimension of weight or importance.").
67

68
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provides: "'No man may profit from his own wrong.' 69 Such a principle does not set out the conditions under which it will be satisfied,
but merely provides a reason to argue in favor of one particular conclusion. 70 Nevertheless, in interpreting a principle, one must weigh
the outcome of its application against the results suggested by other
relevant and potentially contradictory principles. 71 For example, when
considering the appropriateness of restrictions on door-to-door solicitations, ajudge should balance the principle that "free speech should
be protected" against the principle that "privacy of the home is sacred." Balancing all relevant principles should produce the appropri72
ate conclusion.
While multiple principles may apply simultaneously, multiple
rules may not. If two rules conflict in a particular situation, only one
of them can apply, and the decision as to which is valid must come
from considerations outside of the rules themselves.73
Additionally, a principle is concerned with what is fair or just, incorporating some dimension of morality.14 Such an element is not essential to a rule. Legal principles, insofar as they are morally correct,
are a subset of moral principles, demarcated by their justificatory relationship to the extant law. 75 That is, legal principles serve to justify
some set of settled law, and as I have discussed, judges rely on those
principles to decide hard cases. Sometimes judges incorrectly identify
these principles, and other times they incorrectly apply them-such a
difficult task does not provide for any easy answers. Consequently,
judges make mistakes and disagree with each other in determining
the proper principles and how to balance them.
For example, the majority in Roe relied on a legal principle that
recognized the right of privacy. 6 Specifically, the Court argued that
the principles underlying earlier privacy decisions, such as Stanley v.

69

Id.

70
71

Id.
Id. at 26-27.

72

See Perry, supra note 47, at 788 (arguing that the overall balance of principles,

which are "commensurable and capable of being aggregated, along their dimension of
weight, ... yield[] an overall conclusion about what ought to be done").
73 DWORKIN, supra note
13, at 27.
74

Id. at 22.

75 Id. at 22-29; see also Alexander & Kress, supra note 15, at
744 ("In a mature, de-

cent legal system, we should expect significant overlap between the classes of legal and
moral principles, but neither identity between nor subsumption of one class under the
other.").
76 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
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Georgia,7 should be applied in the context of abortion. Opponents
of the Roe decision, if operating within the Dworkinian framework of
legal principle, must explain why the Court should have relied on different principles that do not permit abortion and that reflect a better
understanding of the Constitution and pertinent case law.79
Another difference is that principles can justify a rule, but a rule
cannot justify a principle."' For example, Roe held that a woman may
obtain an abortion subject to the medical judgment of her physician.8'
The Court justified this rule by balancing the principles governing a
woman's right to privacy against the state's interest in protecting potential life during the first trimester. The relationship between the
principles and the rule is not reciprocal. The rule cannot justify this
balance of principles.
Now that we have a better understanding of the characteristics of
legal principles and how they differ from rules, we are in a better position to understand the role they play in determining whether a judge
must reject precedent.
II.

THE ROLE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE REJECTION OF PRECEDENT

A. Principlesand Precedent
I will start by making a distinction between first- and second-order
legal principles, generally following Stephen Perry's lead.' First-order
legal principles are those substantive principles that a judge weighs
against one another, the ultimate balance of which will determine the
appropriate resolution of a case. Simply put, first-order legal principles are reasons used in deciding the merits of a case. For example,
the principle that "the government should not violate the privacy of
the bedroom" is a first-order principle.

394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (considering the importance of the principle that one
should "be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy").
78 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53; see also RONALD DWORK1N,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 54 (1996) (discussing how the Roe Court
"argue[d] that the principles latent in the earlier privacy decisions about sterilization
and family and contraception must be applied to the abortion case as well").
79 DWORKIN, supra
note 78, at 54.
80 See Perry, supra note 47, at 788 ("Principles
can justify rules, but not vice versa.").
81 410 U.S. at
163-64.
82 For a discussion of the interplay between practical
reason and precedent, see
Perry, supra note 47, at 797, as well as Perry, supra note 10, at 219-23.
77
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Second-order legal principles provide reasons for how a judge
should balance one first-order principle in relation to others. That is,
a second-order principle suggests how ajudge should weigh first-order
principles. Consider the following example of a second-order principle: "A legal principle deriving from a historically older case that has
never been overturned should be given more weight than a principle
,,813
derived from a substantially more recent case.
As this example
demonstrates, a second-order legal principle does not help one decide how to resolve the substantive issue of a particular case-should
women have the right to abortion?-but instead helps one decide the
extent to which the first-order legal principles will be relevant and
useful in answering that question.
Using this terminology, consider what a judge hopes to accomplish when rejecting precedent. Usually, she would like to replace the
old balance of first-order legal principles, as applied to a specific area
of law, with what she believes is a more justified balance of first-order
principles. This new balance might include introducing new principles, or it might simply involve reweighing the principles of the old
balance. The simplest form of rejection of precedent is when ajudge
would like to replace first-order principle X with the first-order principle not-X. For example, in Brown v. Board of Education, one might describe the Court's
actions as the rejection of the principle "separate
'4
but equal.
A judge may not reject precedent, however, merely because she
disagrees with it. Even the Supreme Court must obey certain standards that dictate when it is appropriate to reject prior reasoning.8" In
its most general form, the doctrine of stare decisis reflects the notion

83 An example of this principle in practice is Butterfield
v. Forrester,103 Eng. Rep.
926 (K.B. 1809), which many torts textbooks still use to demonstrate the basic doctrine
of contributory negligence even though it is now almost 200 years old. One should
give more weight to the principles justifying this case than a conflicting principle derived from a more recent case.
84 See 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[I]n the field of public
education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place."). For another remark about the implications of
Brown, see infra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
85 One such standard is the doctrine of legislative supremacy. See,
e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962) ("[W]e have no power to change deliberate choices of legislative policy that Congress has made within its constitutional
powers."). This doctrine requires the court to give a certain amount of deference to
the legislature. This is a standard that Dworkin considers in the context of overturning
precedent. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 37-38.
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that judges should give an appropriate degree of deference to prior
reasoning.
Deference to prior reasoning serves at least two functions. First, it
allows for predictability, enabling members of the general population-the pool of would-be litigants-to form concrete expectations
regarding how the law will treat their actions. Predictability takes on
greater importance in certain contexts, such as voluntary transactions
(e.g., contracts), than it does in other contexts, such as involuntary
87
transactions (e.g., torts).
In an area of the law like torts, which governs involuntary transactions, a judge may give less deference to
precedent because predictability serves a less important purpose in
that context.88
Second, precedent provides stability to a legal system. "9 When a
court rejects what formerly had been the accepted balance of principles in an area of law, this can have a ripple effect into other areas.
For example, a substantial revision of contract law could have effects
in tort law. The easier a legal system makes it for judges to reject
precedent, the more unstable the legal system becomes.
In our common law tradition, there are many standards dictating
when it is appropriate to reject prior reasoning. Such standards are
examples of second-order legal principles.90 They provide guidance
for choosing among competing principles-namely, those first-order
principles embodied in the precedent and those first-order principles
with which the judge would like to replace the former first-order principles. These second-order principles do not themselves suggest how
thejudge should resolve the substantive issues of the case.
I would like to note here, as it will be important for subsequent
discussion, thatjudges may disagree about the proper balance of both
first- and second-order principles. For example, judges may differ
86

Perry, supra note 10, at 241, defines the doctrine in this manner:

[R]elative weight .. assigned to [a] given proposition of law [is generally] a
complex function of many different factors, including the position ... of the
courts that have relied upon the proposition in the past, the number of times
that it has been so relied upon, and the age of the relevant precedents.
87 Id. at 249.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., id. at 250 (explaining that, when the justification for a decision is so entrenched in the "interlocking network of dispute-settling procedures," courts should
be limited in their "capacity to make an immediate, sweeping change in the settled
law" by overruling such a decision).
90 For our purposes, I will treat second-order legal principles as more
particular
iterations of the general interests of the doctrine of stare decisis:
stability. These interests are discussed more below, infra Part lI.B.
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regarding the degree of deference that is appropriate in a given situation. This point is essential to understanding the dispute over Roe
within a framework of Dworkinian principles: the majority and minority not only disagree about the substantive holding of Roe, but they
also disagree over how much deference one should give it as precedent. That disagreement turns on the following question: What are
the appropriate standards in the law that address the level of deference owed?
B. Precedent and Mistake
So far, I have said that the concern for predictability and stability
justifies, at least in part, deference to precedent. Now I want to address the flip side of this issue, the justification for the rejection of
precedent.
Because choosing between competing legal principles is extremely
difficult, a legal system should frequently rethink the balance it has
struck between principles and continually revisit past precedent in
light of recent experience and debate. The doctrine of precedent
gives added weight to prior reasoning, for reasons I have explored,
but this presumption in favor of the status quo often can-and
should-be overcome. A legal system allows for the rejection of
precedent because it recognizes the possibility of error inherent in
rendering judgments. The kind of error I am concerned with here is
a mistake in balancing principles.
One should understand the doctrine of stare decisis as a tradeoff
between predictability and stability on one side and perceived correctness on the other.' That is, a court may reject precedent when an
appropriate level of confidence that the precedent was wrongly decided outweighs the value of predictability and stability. The present
Court believes that the precedent it rejects contains a balance of principles that no longer falls within an acceptable "range of moral plau92
sibility. ,
At this point, we are in a position to begin to appreciate the important role that a judge's confidence plays in deciding whether to
abide by or reject precedent. Ajudge weighs her level of confidence

91

See Perry, supra note 47, at 817 ("Legal principles represent... a trade-off be-

tween perceived moral correctness, on the one hand, and consistency and predictability, on the other.... In an epistemically nontransparent world, a trade-off of this kind
is inevitable.").
92

Id.
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in the likelihood that particular precedent has been wrongly decided
against the need for predictability and stability. Only when the judge's
confidence is suitably high may she properly reject precedent. The
question I would like to address now is what ingredients should constitute ajudge's level of confidence.
C. Confidence: What Constitutes It?
In his partial dissent in Casey, Justice Antonin Scalia expressed a
high level of confidence that the Constitution does not grant women a
right to have an abortion.9 I would like to explore the basis on which
ajustice such as Scalia 94 should build such confidence.
The majority in Roe essentially identified two major competing
principles. On one side of the balance, the Court considered a
woman's right to privacy, stemming from earlier constitutional case
law.95 The Court argued that this right encompassed the right to an
abortion.96 On the other side of the balance, the Court considered
the state's interest in protecting potential life, arguing that this interest grew stronger as the fetus progressed in age. 97 The Court decided
the case based on what it perceived to be the relative strengths of
these competing considerations.98
The right to privacy and the interest in protecting potential life
are both instances of what I have termed first-order principles. The
For instance, Justice Scalia made this emphatic statement:
[As to] whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is... protected by the Constitution of the United States[,] I am sure it is not... because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about
it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it
to be legally proscribed.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94 In Freedom'sLaw, DWORKIN, supra note 78,
at 126-27, Dworkin argues that Scalia
does not operate within the framework that the Constitution creates a system of principles. It would be a mistake, then, for one to ask how Scalia would justify his partial
dissent in terms of a different balance of principle, if in fact he rejects such an inquiry
as to the nature of his judicial capacity.
95 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Other principles argue in favor
of this
particular privacy right; as Dworkin puts it in Freedom'sLaw, DWORKIN, supra note 78, at
54, "These earlier privacy decisions can themselves be defended in a similar way, as
part of a broader project of the Court ... to identify and enforce the principles
[that] ... a society truly committed to individual liberty and dignity must recognize."
96 Roe, 410 U.S.
at 154.
97 Id. at 162-64.
98 How one should properly balance the two chief considerations here
is by no
means an easy task. The answers to any such moral question are far from transparent.
93
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way a judge balances first-order principles such as these will guide the
resolution of the case.q The strength of the balance in favor of one
side should constitute the degree of the judge's confidence.
Let me illustrate with an example in the context of everyday decision making. Consider a jury member forced to decide whether or
not the defendant committed the crime in question. One can imagine the following crude model of the jury member's decision-making
process (to which I shall refer as the 'jury member model"). She
draws two columns on a piece of paper. The left-hand column contains reasons in favor of guilt, and the right-hand column contains
reasons in favor of innocence. Further, the factors vary in strength.
The jury member represents this numerically, ranking each reason for
or against the defendant's innocence on a scale of one to ten. 10 0 Having ranked each factor, the jury member sums the relative strength of
the factors in the left-hand column and then does the same for the
right-hand column. She bases her belief about whether the defendant
is guilty on which column has the highest number. The difference between the relative strength of each side should constitute her level of
confidence in the decision she makes. For example, if the factors in
favor of guilt total one hundred and the factors in favor of innocence
total ninety-nine, the jury member should conclude that the defendant is guilty, but attach the lowest possible confidence to this belief.
In fact, one would not expect such a level of confidence to meet the
criminal law's "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.' °l Of course,
this model is extremely crude because it assumes that one can treat
reasons contributing to guilt or innocence and the attempt to balance
them in such a mathematical fashion. Even so, the jury member
model illustrates how the strength of the balance of reasons in favor of
one position should constitute one's confidence in the decision made.
With the jury member model in place, we are in a position to understand the basis for ajudge's confidence that the court reached the

99 The

process of balancing principles is a difficult task of practical judgment. In

making such a determination, ajudge might consider other first-order principles. She
might also take into account second-order principles that help her determine how
much weight to give a particular first-order principle, supra Part II.A.
100Of course, how the jury member should rank the relative strength of each factor will take into account other considerations, and the model would grow more complicated if it represented this reality.
101This point has more general relevance for a later Section, infra Part II.E, in
which I discuss how much confidence a judge should need to overturn precedent. In
some cases, the judge may need a relatively high level, on par with what the court requires of ajury member.
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wrong result in a prior case. Generally speaking, one's confidence
that a court reached the wrong decision will take one of two forms.' 2
First, one may believe that the court correctly identified the proper
principles to balance, but improperly balanced them. In this scenario,
one's confidence that the precedent is erroneous will correspond with
one's perception of the strength of that balance. For example, one
may agree that Roe should have been decided by balancing the two
primary interests that the Court identified. At the same time, however, one might believe that the state's interest in protecting potential
life at any point after conception outweighs a woman's privacy right
and, thus, that Roe was wrongly decided. The degree to which one believes that the interest in preserving life outweighs the right to privacy
determines that person's amount of confidence.
The second form of confidence that a particular precedent was
wrongly decided is based on the belief that the court did not even
consider the proper principles. For example, one might not think
that the right of privacy encompasses the right to an abortion. If this
conclusion were correct, one could rightfully object to the Court's
consideration of and heavy emphasis on that principle. In addition,
one might argue that the Court should have considered certain principles that it did not, such as "the longstanding traditions of American
society. ", 10 3 As one can see here, one may disagree with a precedent
such as Roe because it weighed some factors it should not have while it
failed to consider other factors that it should have. Once one weighs
the factors she thinks should have been considered, the strength of
that balance should constitute her confidence.
D. Good Faith
Recall the concern of the cynic from the Introduction. °4 The
cynic feared that a judge could manipulate the legal arguments to
support whatever result she desired. Let me rephrase this concern
with the terminology I have developed: a judge will disingenuously
"balance" the relevant first-order principles in such a way as to achieve
any outcome she desires. The judge could rig the balance strongly in
favor of one side, providing the basis for a high, but sham, level of

102
103

These two forms need not be mutually exclusive.
This is one ofJustice Scalia's considerations in PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern

Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992). See also supra note 93 (quoting Scalia's
evocation of this principle).
104 Supra p. 1222.
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judicial confidence. To confront this charge, our account of confidence and precedent must make three assumptions: 0 5 (1) In most
cases, there is a right answer to how a case should be decided; (2)
judges generally have the capacity to appreciate and weigh properly
the range of arguments in favor of each side; and (3) judges are capable of a good faith attempt to discern the right answer and the arguments supporting it.10 6 I will discuss each assumption in turn.
First, regarding how a case should be decided, one must assume
that some answers are better than others and that, in general, there is
a right answer. This assumption does not suggest that the best arguments are easily discernible or that there will be consensus in the legal
community as to how a case should have been decided.'0 7 Rather, this
assumption merely rejects the skeptical view, which posits that the law
does not actually dictate a right answer to a given case.
One should not rule out the possibility, however, that, in some
cases, the arguments favoring each side may be evenly balanced. In
such cases, literally speaking, there would not be a correct decision.
Just the same, judges should approach a case as if a right decision exists, even if there may be some instances where the law does not dictate a decision for one side or the other.
Second, one must assume thatjudges are at least capable of grasping the right answer. That is, the possibility must exist that the judge
will correctly decide a case by more than bare chance.'s One should
assume that judges have a certain amount of efficacy in their ability
to get cases right for the right reasons and that they are capable of
105Dworkin's theory of adjudication generally makes all three of these assump-

tions for all cases in the law. DWORKIN, supra note 13, at 46-80. Of course, other conceptions of the law might not make these assumptions. As we have seen, positivists
such as Hart would reject the first assumption in the context of hard cases. That is,
Hart would say that the law is indeterminate when a legal rule does not provide an answer, meaning that there is no right way the case should be decided. HART, supra note
11, at 126-29. If a rule had clear application to a case, however, Hart might make all
three assumptions in that limited circumstance.
106I would like to acknowledge the help I received from Professor Stephen
R.
Perr yin formulating these three assumptions.
7 See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Law and Objectivity, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 969, 977 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro
eds., 2002) (discussing two possible dimensions of objectivity in the law, the first of
which corresponds to my first assumption: "[First,] [t]he law is metaphysically objective
in so far as there exist right answers as a matter of law").
10sThis second assumption corresponds with the second dimension of objectivity
Brian Leiter discusses. See id. at 977 ("[Second,] [t]he law is epistemically objective in so
far as the mechanisms for discovering right answers (e.g.[,] adjudication, legal reasoning) are free of distorting factors that would obscure right answers.").
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grasping the range of reasonable arguments relevant to a given case.
The phrase "range of reasonable arguments" connotes that a judge
can forward more than one possible argument in good faith. Within
that range are conflicting positions, and accordingly, judges may disagree about how best to resolve a particular case. This second assumption requires, however, that judges have the capacity to appreciate and operate within such a range.
The second assumption also presupposes that other impediments,
such as a set of subconscious motivations that would hamper a judge's
ability to discern the right answer, do not exist. On a more general
level, as Brian Leiter has noted, a judge's process of weighing the relevant arguments must not involve "distorting factors" with the potential
to "obscure right answers."' 9 To take the position that a judge could
not overcome such subconscious motivations, or distorting factors
more generally, would be to succumb to a form of skepticism. This
particular skeptical concern supposes that there is a right answer as to
how a given case should be decided, but that such subconscious barriers to a judge's capacity to weigh the relevant arguments prevent the
judge from discerning it. But to accept this concern as insurmountable from the perspective of Dworkin's theoretical framework would
be to throw one's hands in the air in defeat. The theoretical hope
that a judge can appreciate the relevant range of arguments in an effort to properly decide a case rests on an assumption that rejects this
kind of barrier to ajudge's capacity to reason.
The first two assumptions say that there is most often a right answer to a case and that the judge has a capacity to appreciate the arguments that support it. The third and final assumption requires that
the judge try her best, making a good faith effort, to use her capacity
to discern those arguments that support how the case should be decided. If a judge only decides cases in a way that advances her political agenda, then the first two assumptions would matter little, and the
charge of the cynic would remain. Ultimately, a judge may vote the
way she would have if she had been motivated solely by realpolitik.
But this outcome is not problematic so long as she actually believes,
having made a good faith effort, that the law dictates this result.
It may be worth taking a moment to consider how one should understand ajudge's political beliefs and the relation of these beliefs to
the decision-making process. It may be conceptually possible to understand one's political beliefs, most sympathetically, as justified

109 Id.
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through a considered balance of first-order principles, albeit not legal
ones. That is, one's set of political beliefs is a reflection of a reasoned
attempt to consider the reasons for and against such a view. Nonetheless, the principles underlying the law might not correspond with the
reasons that justify one's political views. Thus, the judge must take
care not to import into the law the reasons she has for her own beliefs.
This is an especially hard demand when the law calls upon the judge
to determine what is essentially a moral question, such as whether the
liberties the Constitution protects include the right to abortion.
If one accepts these three assumptions, one need not fear that a
judge will develop a level of confidence based on a sham consideration of the law. I should make clear, however, that these assumptions
will hardly guarantee agreement among judges. It is an extremely
challenging task to figure out the proper balance of principles reqqired to resolve a hard case. It is quite possible that two judges, both
having made a good faith effort, will disagree about the proper resolution of a case.
E. Confidence: How Much Is Enough?
In the few previous Sections, we have explored what should
constitute confidence. We have seen that it consists in substantive
considerations about the proper balance of the relevant first-order
principles."" Also, I have responded to the cynic by presenting the assumptions necessary to defuse the concern that the judge's confidence could take its strength from sham reasoning.1 ' Now we are in a
position to ask the second part of our question concerning confidence: How much of it is enough to overturn precedent? Recall the
statement that precedent represents a balance between stability and
1
predictability on the one hand and correctness on the other." 2 Suppose that a judge has determined, in good faith, that she disagrees
with some precedent and now must decide whether to overturn it.
The crucial question that the judge must answer, then, is whether
the precedent no longer falls within an acceptable range of correctness, to the extent that rejecting it outweighs the damage such rejection causes to the legal system's stability and predictability.
As we have seen, however, the judge's confidence in the suitability
of some precedent is a matter of degree. That is, a judge may believe
110See supra pp. 1238-41 (employing examples to assert this proposition).
112

Supra Part II.D.
Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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that a previous case was wrongly decided, but only have marginal confidence in this belief. Now we are in a position to see, in general
terms, what is required for a judge '1 3 to reject precedent. The judge
must determine, with a sufficient degree of confidence, whether the
precedent no longer falls within an acceptable range of correctness. I
will next address the considerations that factor into what should constitute that sufficient degree.
As I have already explored and reiterated in this Part, precedent
serves the interests of predictability and stability. I would like to treat
these two interests as principles in themselves relevant to resolution of
the case. 1 4 The question that I would like to examine now is whether
one should treat the interests of predictability and stability as first- or
second-order principles. As we will see, these paths of analysis, for the
most part, are really two sides of the same coin. Even so, I will argue
that treating the interests of stability and predictability as a secondorder operation provides for a more sophisticated basis on which the
demands of precedent can work.
If one treated predictability and stability as first-order principles,
one would balance them along with the other relevant first-order
principles in deciding the merits of the case. Let us take Roe as an
example, using the crude jury member model I developed earlier.
Suppose that a Supreme Court Justice must consider the question of
whether a woman has the right to an abortion. On one side, she
weighs the first-order principles in favor of this right. To reiterate,
this process would at least include examining the following: (1) the
value of a woman's right to privacy; (2) the force of previous case law,
particularly the line of cases expounding upon one's constitutional
right of privacy; and (3) textual support in the Constitution itself for
determining that the right of privacy encompasses the right to abortion."1 If one understands the interests of predictability and stability
as first-order principles, then the Justice should include them on this
side of the balance. Of course, the weight she should assign to those
I am assuming here that the judge is of sufficient authority within the
judicial
hierarchy to entertain the rejection of precedent.
114 1 state this at its most general level.
When actually applying these principles to
a case, only some more specific iteration of the general principle of stability or predictability may be relevant. For instance, the only applicable principle of stability that
may apply could be an example I used earlier: "A legal principle deriving from a historically older case that has never been overturned should be given more weight than a
principle derived from a substantially more recent case." For the first use of this example, see supra text accompanying note 83.
"15 Supra text accompanying
notes 95-96.
113
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interests will depend on a number of other factors. These include
how much people have come to rely on Roe, as well as the potential
damage to the stability of the legal system if Roe were overturned. On
the other side of the balance, the Justice weighs the principles in favor
of rejecting such a right. Thus, on one side, there are the first-order
principles and their relative weights, including the force of predictability and stability. On the other side, there are the first-order principles weighing against the right.
The consequence of this analysis is that a judge, in order to arrive
at the conclusion that Roe should be rejected, must outweigh not only
the principles in favor of the right, but also the additional weight
gained from the interests of predictability and stability. Understanding the operation of stare decisis in this way, the amount of confidence that a judge needs to overrule the precedent must be more
than: (1) the strength of the principles in favor of the precedent,
combined with (2) the weight of the interests of predictability and
stability on the side of the precedent.
As a second conceptual possibility, one could treat the interests of
predictability and stability as second-order principles. As I have said,
second-order principles provide guidance for how a judge should
weigh first-order principles. 16 Understood this way, predictability and
stability function as guides that instruct the judge to assign more
weight to the first-order principles justifying the precedent.
For a judge in a position to reconsider a case like Roe, these two
second-order principles would instruct her to give more weight to the
reasoning of the Roe majority' 7 than if she were considering the matter de novo. To put it another way, consider again the jury member
model.' 18 Under the conceptual framework of that model, the judge
would list in each column, so to speak, the first-order principles and
their relative weights according to which side of the merits they support. The second-order principles of predictability and stability operate in such a way as to increase the relative weights of the considerations that would be placed in the left column. Thus, the judge would
attribute more weight to each first-order principle in favor of the right
to abortion than she would have otherwise. The amount of confidence the judge would need to overturn the precedent, then, would
116

Supra p. 1236. I should note here that the strength of predictability and stabil-

ity as second-order principles could vary from instance to instance.
117 Here, the relevant reasoning of the Roe majority is how it articulated
and balanced the particular first-order principles.
118 Supra p. 1240.
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have to exceed the strength of the principles in favor of the precedent. In this way, the status quo gains a certain strength that it would
not otherwise possess.
Stephen Perry offers an additional consideration for the second
conceptual view, for which he has argued under certain circumstances. In general, Perry argues that the practice of stare decisis takes
place through the operation of second-order principles. 9 Even so, he
argues that "once a practice of following precedent is in place, there
may be a kind of feedback effect: the justified expectations and the
reasonable reliance to which the practice gives rise are first-order reaindeed be taken into account in the overall balance
sons that should
120
of principles."
The consequences of the second conceptual approach, then,
would be as follows. First, second-order principles will function parasitically on the first-order principles, increasing the weight of these
first-order considerations in favor of the precedent. 2 Second, the
empirical question of whether people have come to rely on the precedent is a first-order consideration. That is, whether or not people
have actually come to rely on the precedent should make a difference
in analyzing the strength of the precedent.
In sum, we have two strong lines of analysis by which we can understand the operation of stability and predictability. In many respects, each accords precedential reasoning added weight. In their
purpose, then, they do not differ. Even so, I now would like to argue
that the better of the two is the second conception, which treats the
two interests strictly as second-order principles. This method allows us
to consider, for every first-order consideration, how much additional
weight that particular factor should receive from the two second-order
interests. That is, it instructs the judge to consider, one by one, the
increase in weight that stability and predictability give to each factor.
This additional inquiry allows for a more nuanced operation of the

119

See Perry, supra note 47, at 800 ("The only plausible justification that can be of-

fered for a judicial practice of following precedent will look to the rule-of-law values
[predictability and stability], and in a legal system based on summary rules those values
take effect, I have argued, through the operation of second-order principles." (footnote omitted)).
120 Id.
121 This proposition represents my understanding of Perry's suggestion in the lexicon that I have developed.
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interests. The first conception, by contrast, offers no such opportu122
nity to adjust the weight of each factor.
F. JudicialDisagreementat the Second Level
We have seen that judges, even when they operate in good faith,
can disagree over the proper balance of the relevant first-order principles, as well as over the determination of which principles are
relevant in the first instance. Disagreement is not contained there.
Judges may also disagree about how to apply the relevant secondorder principles and about which ones are even appropriate to consider. In the previous Section, I offered an account of the doctrine of
precedent in terms of second-order principles. Disagreement over
second-order principles in the context of precedent, then, amounts to
a dispute over the exact commands of stare decisis.
Such a consequence is unavoidable. From a theoretical standpoint, one can generally mandate that a judge carefully weigh her desire to overturn a past decision she believes was wrongly decided
against the interests of stare decisis: predictability and stability. I have
attempted to formulate such an account over the past few Sections. I
have given an account of what should constitute confidence in the way
a case should be decided. Furthermore, I have attempted to specify
how much of that confidence one needs to overturn precedent as a
function of the interests of stability and predictability operating as
second-order principles. Yet, proper application of these secondorder principles is not a task for which one can write an algorithm. It
is a difficult task over which judges will disagree, even when operating
in good faith. It requires sensitive application of certain principles to
a highly particularized set of facts. Disagreement is an inevitability.
In fact, the doctrine of stare decisis is a recognition that mistakes
happen and disagreements occur. It allows a legal system to balance
the interest in correcting those mistakes with the countervailing need
for stability. Of course,judges will disagree about whether a particular
precedent is erroneous. Stare decisis mediates that disagreement by
affording more weight to precedential reasoning. At the same time,
122 Yet, a commensurate opportunity may
exist. The first conception forces the
judge to consider how predictability and stability should be weighed against other firstorder principles. Potentially, this assessment may require ajudge to weigh stability and
predictability against each first-order interest when determining the relative strength of
the individual factors. This kind of balancing act may provide identical results to those
achieved by treating the interests of predictability and stability as second-order principles.
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however, it allows a judge to overcome such a presumption when she
has a sufficient degree of confidence. In this way, stare decisis establishes ground rules that provide a basis for principled accommodation
of such disagreement.
Yet, when a judge applies the doctrine of stare decisis, she is no
more immune from mistake than in any other determination about
the proper balance of principles. Ajudge could overestimate the importance of predictability in a particular precedent, for example. The
doctrine of stare decisis must recognize thatjudges will make mistakes
even when applying the very doctrine of stare decisis itself. And as always, judges will disagree as to when these mistakes occur. While I
have said that stare decisis establishes ground rules to accommodate
disagreement, one can now see that such rules are only provisional.
They are provisional in the sense that their proper application is not
immune from debate and, ultimately, revision.
G. Disagreementat Both Levels: Roe v. Wade
As I noted at the outset, the Supreme Court in Casey carefully considered the mandates of stare decisis when it reconsidered and upheld
Roe. The Court stated:
[W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the
ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming
123
and overruling a prior case.

The Court enumerated a series of factors important for the reconsideration of a prior holding: (1) the practical workability of the current
rule, (2) people's reliance on the rule, (3) any development in other
areas of law that has made the precedent outdated, and (4) any
124
In its discussion of
change to the factual premises behind the rule.
these factors, one can see the Court weighing the interests of stare decisis: the Court balances predictability and stability, on the one hand,
with the interest of remedying past error, if any, on the other. For example, the Court found no indication of practical unworkability and
took this as evidence of Roe's validity. 25 To take another example, the
second consideration explicitly acknowledges the expectations of those

123
124
125

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
Id. at 854-55.
Id. at 855.
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who have come to rely on the law. The Court found this factor to
weigh particularly heavily, saying that, since Roe, "people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on 1the
availability of
26
abortion in the event that contraception should fail."
The Court interpreted these and other factors as weighing in favor
of affirming Roe. The majority determined that the weight of the firstorder principles in favor of the right to abortion, "combined with the
force of stare decisis," was enough to outweigh
"the reservations any
1 7
2
Roe.
reaffirming"
in
[had]
have
may
[Justice]
The majority did not stop there, however. It distinguished Roe as
deserving special treatment under the doctrine of stare decisis. Unlike the vast majority of cases, the Court stated that,
[w] here ... the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort
of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national
2 8 division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.1
This premise, if true, demands the highest level of confidence imag-

inable for purposes of overruling Roe.1 9 To justify setting the bar so
high, the majority compared Roe to the Lochner v. New York13 0 and Plessy
32
v. Ferguson 31 decisions, the overrulings of which proved monumental.
In overruling the former, the Court rejected Lochner's mantra of contractual freedom, which effectively denied the states the ability to accomplish improvements in working conditions. 33 In overruling the
latter, the Court repudiated the "separate but equal" interpretation of
the equal protection clause.1 4 In both instances, the Court only rejected the precedent on the basis of many years' experience, as well as
Id. at 856.
Id. at 853 (italics omitted).
128 Id. at 866-67.
129 See DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 115 ("So important a decision should not be
overruled, after nearly twenty years, unless it is clearly wrong .....
130 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
131 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
132 Lochner and Plessy were overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 400 (1937), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954), respectively.
133 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S.
at 379.
134 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
126
127
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a changed understanding of the principles underlying the Constitution. As the Casey Court put it, to overrule Roe "in the absence of the
most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision" would5
undermine "the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question. "s"
To frame the Court's analysis in the terminology I have established,
the Court found that the second-order function of the principles of
stare decisis operated so as to demand the highest level of confidence
possible to reject Roe.
The partial dissent vigorously disagreed at two levels. At the first
level, it disagreed with the balance of first-order principles inherent
in Roe. The partial dissent rejected Roe's interpretation of the string
of privacy cases (starting with Stanley v. Georgia 36") as granting an allencompassing right to privacy.
That is, it repudiated the "right of
personal privacy" created by Roe: 38 "This right of privacy.., is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. ", 39 Thus, it rejected outright the chief first-order principle upon which Roe relied. The confidence of the partial dissent that
Roe was erroneously decided should correspond to the strength of its
belief that women have no such liberty in the Constitution.
At the second level, the partial dissent's disagreement took on two
forms. First, it opposed the Court's application of certain principles
of stare decisis.'4 Second, it insisted that at crucial places the Court
had applied the wrong standards.14 For example, while the partial
dissent generally agreed with the applicability of certain factors, such
as the importance of reliance, it took issue with the Court's application of them. The Rehnquist opinion disputed the applicability of
"any traditional notion of reliance" for two reasons. 42 For one, the
majority in Casey had already altered the trimester framework upon
which people had come to rely. 143 Rehnquist argued that, if reliance

135

505 U.S. at 867.

136

394 U.S. 557 (1969).

137 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 951 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in

part) (arguing against a "right of privacy").
138 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973).
19 Id. at
153.
140 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 955-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (criticizing the application of factual underpinnings, doctrinal foundations,
and reliance interests in Roe).
141 See id. at 958-64 (criticizing the distinction of Roe
as a more important and protected ruling).
142 Id. at 956.
143

Id. at 873.
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on the trimester framework was not important, then perhaps reliance
on other elements of the holding was not either. Additionally, he argued that people could take immediate account of the Court rejecting
Roe. 144 That is, while many people had indeed come to rely on Roe,
Rehnquist could discern no reason why people could not make an
immediate adjustment given the nature of family planning.
The partial dissent took issue with more than the proper application of such principles. It disagreed with the majority over which
principles even applied, and most importantly, it rejected the Court's
elevation of Roe as a special case for which one would need the highest level of confidence to reject. 14 One should understand this conflict not as a disagreement over the proper application of a given
standard, but instead, as a dispute over what the proper standard
should be. Injustice Scalia's partial dissent, for example, he mocked
the suggestion that Roe resolved the divisive issue of abortion. He
proclaimed instead that it had only served to 146
amplify the debate and
improperly take the issue away from the states.
One can now see that Roe is an exemplar of precedential reasoning over which judges can disagree both about its balance of firstorder principles and how much weight it should be afforded as precedent. In the following passage, Dworkin accurately proscribes how the
partial dissent should proceed:
[Roe's opponents] should try to meet [its proponents' arguments] in the
traditional way, by explaining why principles different from those mentioned, which do not yield a right to abortion, provide a more satisfactory interpretation of the Constitution as a whole and of the Court's past
decisions under it. Of course different judges will come to very different
conclusions about which principles provide the best interpretation of the
Constitution, and since there is no neutral standpoint from which it can
be proved which side is right, each justice must
4 7 in the end rely on his or
her convictions about which argument is best.1

Not only must a judge rely on her convictions-her degree of confidence-about the merits of the underlying case, she must also rely on
her convictions about the proper amount of conviction the precedent
demands-how much confidence is enough.

144 Id. at

956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 956-64.
146 Id. at 995 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
147 DWORKIN, supra note 78,
at 54.
145
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CONCLUSION

Within Dworkin's theory of adjudication, I argued for the normative considerations that should constitute a judge's degree of confidence appropriate to reject precedent. I argued that one's confidence should correspond to the strength of the balance of first-order
principles. I noted that this account assumed that a judge is capable
of a good faith balancing effort. The amount of confidence necessary
to reject precedent, we explored, should correspond with the strength
of the principles in favor of the precedent, as well as the interests of
stare decisis, operating as second-order principles. Yet, we recognized
that a judge is no more immune from mistake regarding the proper
application of stare decisis than in any other attempt to balance principles. 148 As a consequence, one cannot provide, even from the perspective of a theory of adjudication, agreement over the amount of
confidence sufficient to overturn precedent. To a large extent, the
dispute between the majority and minority in Casey is a realization of
this conclusion. Even so, for a judge committed to Dworkin's framework, the inevitability of disagreement at both levels does not justify
resignation. Instead, the proper response is to articulate as best one
can why one's balance of both first- and second-order principles provides the best interpretation of the relevant law.

148

Supra p. 1249.
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